Building the Nation: Sovereignty and International Law in the Decolonisation of South Asia by Saksena, P
Journal of the history of  
International Law (2020) 1–28
brill.com/jhil
© Priyasha Saksena, 2020 | doi:10.1163/15718050-12340169
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.
Building the Nation: Sovereignty and International 
Law in the Decolonisation of South Asia 
Priyasha Saksena
Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
P.Saksena@leeds.ac.uk
Received: 03 September 2019 | Revised: 03 February 2020 |  
Accepted: 08 March 2020 | Published online: 10 December 2020
Abstract
The position of the territorially sovereign nation-state as the fundamental build-
ing block of the contemporary world order has come under increasing challenge. 
Historians have long focused on social, cultural, economic, and technological factors 
to examine the constructed nature of the nation-state. In this article, I explore the 
role of law, and specifically the concept of sovereignty, in the creation of the unified 
spatial entity constituting the nation-state. I focus in particular on the decolonisation 
of South Asia and analyse legal arguments made in two international disputes (over 
Hyderabad and the river Indus) to understand the process through which the Indian 
nation-state came into being.
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1 Introduction
The contemporary world order is built around nation-states. Despite signifi-
cant scholarly challenge to the idea that the nation-state is the ‘natural’ or ‘fun-
damental’ building block of the modern world order, it remains the primary 
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unit of political and economic organisation in international affairs.1 Historians 
have questioned narratives of the inexorable move from empire to nation-state 
in the middle of the twentieth century2 by focusing on the manner in which 
numerous actors grappled with a variety of visions of how to transform empire. 
Alternatives to the British Empire, for instance, included the creation of inde-
pendent nation-states, the articulation of anti-imperial internationalisms,3 the 
espousal of federations as a political form to balance competing interests,4 and 
the advocacy of the Commonwealth of Nations as a mechanism for refashion-
ing the empire.5 In most cases, however, these alternative structures did not 
last: federations split up into nation-states and resistance from several newly-
independent states transformed the Commonwealth into a looser, more infor-
mal organisation. As Antony Anghie notes, the mid-twentieth century saw a 
specific vision of sovereignty and the nation-state win out.6
In this article, I hope to lay out a historically informed account of the role 
played by legal ideas, and specifically the concept of sovereignty, in the pro-
duction of a bounded national space and economy, i.e., in the creation of a 
nation-state. Focusing on the decolonisation of South Asia, I trace the manner 
in which a particular conception of sovereignty – that of exclusive, absolute 
territoriality, focused on the creation of centralised economic units – became 
dominant in the middle of the twentieth century, while drowning out visions 
of alternative legal orders.7
1   Ruggie, John. ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’. 
International Organization 47(1) (1993), 139–174; and Agnew, John. ‘The Territorial Trap: 
The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory’. Review of International 
Political Economy 1(1) (1994), 53–80.
2   On empires as a persistent political form, see Burbank, Jane and Frederick Cooper. Empires 
in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011).
3   Goswami, Manu. ‘Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms’. American Historical 
Review 117(5) (2012), 1461–1485.
4   Collins, Michael. ‘Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” ’. Diplomacy and Statecraft 
24(1) (2013), 21–40; Getachew, Adom. Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self- 
Determination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 107–141.
5   Haines, Daniel. ‘A ‘Commonwealth Moment’ in South Asian Decolonization’, in Decolonization 
and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence, eds. Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), 185–202.
6   Anghie, Antony. ‘Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty’, in Bandung, Global 
History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures, eds. Luis Eslava, Michael 
Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 535–551, 542.
7   Apart from ‘territorial sovereignty’, there were other versions of sovereignty articulated by 
different actors in mid-twentieth century South Asia. For a discussion of one such alterna-
tive – divisible sovereignty – put forth by representatives of the princely states, see Saksena, 
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By placing the legal concept of territorial sovereignty as the key connection 
in the process of creating the spatial unity of India, I hope to provide fresh 
insights into the history of the triumph of the territorially sovereign nation-
state. While scholars have traced the critical role of international law and 
institutions in the universalisation of the postcolonial developmental state,8 
links between the economic ideas of anti-colonial nationalists and the push 
towards the territorialisation of the nation remain underexplored. As I eluci-
date later in this article, for many of independent India’s new leaders, central-
ised control and a consolidation of the nation-state’s territories were obvious 
necessities for the planned economy and the nationalist development model 
that they considered to be the basis for building the new nation. This unified 
national space for development, I argue, was created through the articulation 
of the specific legal idea of territorial sovereignty by elite Indian politicians 
and bureaucrats in two international disputes soon after independence. The 
first was a dispute between the princely state of Hyderabad and the dominion 
of India at the United Nations, while the second was a dispute between the 
new dominions of India and Pakistan over the use of water resources of the 
transboundary river Indus and its many tributaries. In both cases, Indian bu-
reaucrats articulated a version of sovereignty focused on the absolute control 
of a defined space and territory. By examining these historical debates, I hope 
to provide fresh perspectives into the creative role played by the concept of 
sovereignty in the construction of the nation-state and its lasting implications.
The vision of territorial sovereignty that was articulated in these disputes 
formed the basis of the Indian nation-state and also laid the foundation for the 
globalisation of the nation-state form. It was repeatedly rearticulated at nu-
merous forums, including, most prominently, the Afro-Asian Conference held 
in Indonesia in 1955, and became the basis for much of the third world’s inter-
ventions in international law. Although reliance on the idea of the nation-state 
was predicated around the promise of independence and the understandable 
desire for economic self-sufficiency in nations ravaged by colonialism, there 
was also a cost to the focus on territory. Linking sovereignty with territoriality 
structured a specific kind of citizen, as a result of which ‘others’ were rendered 
Priyasha. Jousting over Jurisdiction: Sovereignty and International Law in Colonial South Asia, 
c. 1858–1950 (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, unpublished SJD Dissertation, 2018), 137–363.
8   Pahuja, Sundhya. Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 44–94; Eslava, Luis 
and Sundhya Pahuja. ‘The State and International Law: A Reading from the Global South’. 
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development 
11(1) (2020), 118–138, available at: http://humanityjournal.org/issue11-1/the-state-and-interna-
tional-law-a-reading-from-the-global-south/ (last accessed on 25 September 2020).
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outsiders, often leading to violence and economic oppression; the prob-
lem of minorities has, as Antony Anghie argues, haunted third world states 
ever since.9
The article is divided into five parts. First, I explore the complicated histori-
cal events that led to the creation of the nation-states of India and Pakistan 
by tracing the numerous political possibilities that were proposed and aban-
doned during the decolonisation of South Asia. Then, I focus on the influence 
of ‘developmentalism’ on the structure of the new postcolonial political order 
and in particular on the construction of a centralised state and consolidated 
territory. In the next two sections, I examine the legal disputes over Hyderabad 
and the Indus basin to understand how this unified Indian state space was con-
structed through the articulation of a specific vision of territorial sovereignty. 
In the conclusion, I bring together these strands to reflect on the broader con-
sequences of the territorial focus of the Indian nation-state, particularly on 
citizenship and belonging.
2 The Many Visions of Post-Colonial South Asia
The final years of the British in South Asia were marked by war, famine, mili-
tary mutiny, and explosive violence. Anti-colonial struggle and the increasing 
economic costs of imperial administration led to the newly-elected Labour 
government’s decision to quit British India.10 However, negotiations over de-
colonisation were complicated by the political deadlock over the call for a 
separate homeland for South Asian Muslims. Historians have differed over the 
specific nature of this demand, but there is broad agreement about the lack of 
territorial attachment in visions of what would ultimately become the state of 
Pakistan.11 So while Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the All India Muslim 
League, argued that Hindus and Muslims in South Asia constituted two sepa-
rate ‘nations’, he remained ‘extraordinarily vague in his calls for Pakistan as a 
clearly demarcated territorial state’.12
9   Anghie, ‘Third World Sovereignty’ (2017) (n. 6), 551.
10   Talbot, Ian. A History of Modern South Asia: Politics, States, Diasporas (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016), 131–134.
11   For some of the contrasting approaches in the literature on the formation of Pakistan, 
see Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for 
Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Gilmartin, David. Empire and 
Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); 
and Devji, Faisal. Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2013).
12   Gilmartin, David. ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative’. 
Journal of Asian History 57(4) (1998), 1068–1095, 1081.
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Since the relationship between nation and territory remained ambigu-
ous, the numerous plans of devolution of power drafted during the 1940s ad-
vanced loose, federal frameworks with multiple layers of authority rather than 
proposing the partition of British India into two separate states.13 However, 
these plans failed to find acceptance and amidst spiralling violence, the 
viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, developed a plan involving three elements: the 
mixed provinces of Punjab and Bengal would be partitioned along religious 
lines; Hindu-majority provinces would remain in India; and Muslim-majority 
provinces would be given a choice to join India or Pakistan. Alternative plans 
for a united, sovereign Bengal;14 an independent state of Khalistan for the 
Sikhs; and autonomy for the Pashtuns and the Balochs were all abandoned. 
By June 1947, the creation of India and Pakistan as two separate, territorially 
sovereign nation-states was accepted fact.15
The partition plan was limited to British India, an area directly adminis-
tered by colonial officials. Another furious debate concerned the future of 
the 600-odd ‘princely states’, which were ruled by indigenous rulers called 
‘princes’, but remained subject to British ‘influence’.16 Many princes sought 
independence, while others tried to negotiate loose association agreements 
with the new states.17 Several rulers thought that India and Pakistan would 
be too weak to survive for long and made plans to fill the power vacuum by 
creating their own states, fusing neighbouring states into a union, or extending 
their own domains by annexing surrounding territory.18 Ultimately, however, 
the states were bullied, bribed, and cajoled into merging with one of the two 
dominions.19
As these debates illustrate, it was far from inevitable that colonial South 
Asia would be transformed into two territorially consolidated independent 
13   Banerjee-Dube, Ishita. A History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 392, 417–418; Talbot, A History of Modern South Asia 2016 (n. 10), 134.
14   Chakrabarty, Bidyut. ‘An Alternative to Partition: The United Bengal Scheme’. South Asia: 
Journal of South Asian Studies 26(2) (2003), 193–212.
15   Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India 2015 (n. 13), 425–426.
16   Since the category of ‘princely state’ was heavily contested, the exact number of prince-
ly states varied over time. See Ramusack, Barbara. The Indian Princes and their States 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2.
17   Copland, Ian. The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917–1947 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 250–251.
18   Copland, Ian. State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India, c. 1900–1950 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 135–138.
19   For overviews of this process, see Menon, Vapal P. The Story of the Integration of the Indian 
States (New York: Macmillan, 1956); Copland, The Princes of India 1997 (n. 17), 229–287; 
Bangash, Yaqoob Khan. A Princely Affair: The Accession and Integration of the Princely 
States of Pakistan, 1947–1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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nation-states in 1947. Rather, the end result was the consequence of a series 
of political choices made by British and Indian elites during the 1930s and 
early 1940s. Given these multiple political alternatives, why did anti-colonial 
nationalist leaders, particularly in what would become India, advocate the vi-
sion of the territorial nation-state? Scholars of international relations, such 
as Itty Abraham, have traced the privileging of territory to the aftermath of 
the First World War, and specifically to Woodrow Wilson’s articulation of self-
determination within the context of a nation-state.20 Similarly, international 
law scholars like Sundhya Pahuja and Luis Eslava have argued that the nation-
state is an ‘ongoing project’ of international law as self-determination can only 
be practiced within the confines of the nation-state form.21 This view is also 
shared by historians like Prasenjit Duara, who notes that in the context of 
the Cold War, ‘[t]he nation was the only bearer of rights in international soci-
ety, and this recognition was a critical resource for states, whatever their real 
status’.22 And political geographers like Stuart Elden have also suggested that 
the actions of the United Nations during decolonisation privileged the ‘norm 
of sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity’ over alternative approaches such as self-
determination of peoples.23
External requirements, particularly those of recognition under internation-
al law, played a critical role in mandating the nation-state as the default form 
of political organisation in the aftermath of decolonisation. There are, howev-
er, some additional factors to be considered in the South Asian context, where 
India had a slightly easier time than most former colonies in relation to the 
issue of recognition. Unlike other non self-governing colonial territories, India 
(a term used to refer to British India together with the princely states)24 had 
been a member of several international organisations prior to independence.25 
Therefore, many anti-colonial nationalists, including Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to 
be independent India’s first prime minister, were relatively confident that the 
20   Abraham, Itty. How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2014), 46–72.
21   Eslava/Pahuja, ‘The State and International Law’ 2020 (n. 8).
22   Duara, Prasenjit. ‘The Cold War and the Imperialism of Nation-States’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, eds. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 86–101, 97.
23   Elden, Stuart. ‘Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders’. 
SAIS Review of International Affairs 26(1) (2006), 11–24, 12.
24   United Kingdom, Interpretation Act, 1889, Section 18(5).
25   Such membership was riven by controversy. See Legg, Stephen. ‘An International 
Anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations and India’s Princely Geographies’. Journal 
of Historical Geography 43 (2014), 96–110.
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new state would, despite contestations over the exact scope of its territory,26 
succeed to the international legal personality of the colonial entity of India, 
including its membership of the United Nations. Jinnah, however, maintained 
that the colonial entity of India would cease to exist on 15 August 1947, and the 
two succeeding dominions would have equal international status. The ques-
tion was referred to the United Nations, whereupon Ivan Kerno, the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, opined that the partition of British India 
constituted the secession of part of an existing state to create a new state 
(Pakistan); the part that remained (India), therefore, would continue with the 
existing treaty rights and obligations.27 As a result, India retained membership 
of the United Nations, while Pakistan had to apply for membership and was 
ultimately admitted on 30 September 1947.28
Although international recognition was not a significant source of concern 
for independent India’s politicians, there were other arguments in favour of the 
creation of an India with consolidated and demarcated territory and a strong 
central authority to exercise control over that territory.29 Politicians like Nehru 
26   This confusion arose on account of debates over the exact division of territory after the 
partition plan had been agreed. See Devji, Faisal. ‘The Minority as Political Form’, in From 
the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition, eds. Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Rochona Majumdar and Andrew Sartori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 85–95, 
92.
27   Menon, Vapal P. The Transfer of Power in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957), 404–407; and Higgins, Rosalyn. The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 321–322. 
A copy of Kerno’s legal opinion can be found in a later memorandum prepared by the 
Secretariat of the International Law Commission on the succession of states in interna-
tional law. See International Law Commission, The Succession of States in relation to 
Membership in the United Nations, A/CN.4/149, 3 December 1962, available at: http://legal.
un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_149.pdf (last accessed on 25 September 2020).
28   See United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 29, Admission of New Members to the 
UN, S/RES/29, 12 August 1947, available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/29(1947) (last ac-
cessed on 25 September 2020); and United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 108(II), 
Admission of Yemen and Pakistan to membership in the United Nations, A/RES/108(II), 
30 September 1947, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol 
=A/RES/108(II) (last accessed on 25 September 2020).
29   For some scholars, Nehru’s focus on the creation of an Indian nation-state was a stepping-
stone towards the greater goal of erasing boundaries to create a world united by justicia-
ble, universal human rights. See Bhagavan, Manu. ‘A New Hope: India, the United Nations 
and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. Modern Asian Studies 
44(2) (2010), 311–347. However, as Kavita Datla notes, although Nehru was committed to 
international organisations, his government was quick to shut down discussions of al-
legedly ‘domestic’ affairs by the very same organisations. See Datla, Kavita Saraswathi. 
‘Sovereignty and the End of Empire: The Transition to Independence in Colonial 
Hyderabad’. Ab Imperio 3 (2018), 63–88, 80.
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feared that a fragmented political system ‘would prevent a powerful centre 
from determining India’s profile in the world at large’.30 Many Indian elites 
were also horrified by increasing communal violence and hoped that territori-
ally defined citizenship could provide an alternative definition of an overarch-
ing community. This sort of ‘rationalist statism’ was linked with science and 
modernity31 and ultimately with ideas of economic development. Economic 
factors, therefore, played a significant role in the articulation of specific kinds 
of political structures. Several leaders, in particular Nehru and B.R. Ambedkar, 
favoured ‘a strong centre that could ensure proper formulation and imple-
mentation of policies on education, economy and development at a national 
level’.32 For Ambedkar, ideas of economic development were also linked to so-
cial reform and legal protections for marginalised groups; he placed his faith 
in a centralised state for the enactment of social reform policies necessary in a 
caste-ridden society that was resistant to change.33
Despite Ambedkar’s radical ideas of socio-economic change, ideas of de-
velopment in mid-century India were more circumspect and closely associ-
ated with economic planning. As a result, arguments about political structures 
were often framed in terms of their conduciveness for planning. In a 1959 press 
conference, for instance, Nehru argued that a weak federal government would 
have been unable to enact the economic measures that were necessary for the 
effective planning needed ‘to make good after Independence’.34 So the desire to 
resort to planning for ‘development’ was a significant reason for the rejection 
of pre-partition plans that proposed the layering of sovereign powers among 
a variety of political entities in favour of a unified central government that ex-
ercised absolute control over consolidated territory. The nation’s external form 
was, therefore, closely linked with internal political and economic structures. 
To understand the triumph of the idea of territorial sovereignty in South Asia, 
it is necessary to understand the idea of ‘developmentalism’.
30   Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India 2015 (n. 13), 456.
31   Gilmartin, ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History’ 1998 (n. 12), 1081–1082.
32   Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India 2015 (n. 13), 456.
33   Robinson, Rowena. ‘Planning and Economic Development: Ambedkar versus Gandhi’, in 
Invoking Ambedkar: Contributions, Receptions, Legacies, ed. Biswamoy Pati (Delhi: Primus 
Books, 2014), 59–71.
34   Text of Nehru’s press conference, 7 February 1959, in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 
2nd series, vol. 46, ed. Madhavan K. Palat (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 
2012), 152.
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3 Developmentalism
Concerns around ‘development’ permeated colonial South Asia, with anti-
colonial nationalism being predicated on the vision for a better economic 
future for the nation once independence had been achieved.35 Within this 
discourse, there was almost universal acceptance of the promise of economic 
planning and industrialisation for independent India.36 In this, anti-colonial 
nationalists were part of a broader transnational mode of economic thought 
that favoured a strong role for the state in the economy. Although this national 
developmentalist framework can be traced to the influence of late nineteenth-
century political economists like Friedrich List,37 there were additional in-
ternational examples by the 1930s, including Soviet planning, New Deal 
interventions in the United States, Nazi and Fascist economics, and Japanese 
development policies.38
Support for planning crossed a range of political divides. Influential ad-
vocates included technocrats such as the Mysore diwan (chief minister), 
M. Visvesvaraya;39 the Congress Socialist Party, a socialist caucus within the 
Indian National Congress, one of British India’s principal political parties; and 
Indian industrialists.40 These varied voices on the necessity of economic plan-
ning coalesced in the activities of the Congress’ National Planning Committee, 
35   On the reliance on ‘development’ as a means of legitimacy for anti-colonial nationalism, 
see Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 202–205; Goswami, Manu. Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 276.
36   An exception was Gandhi, who advocated decentralised village-based production in a 
framework that provided considerable autonomy for states within the union of India. 
See Ghatak, Subrata. ‘Gandhian Economic Thought and the Economic Policy of the 
Indian National Congress’, in The Indian National Congress and the Political Economy of 
India 1885–1985, eds. Mike Shepperdson and Colin Simmons (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988), 
282–290.
37   On List’s influence on anti-colonial nationalists in South Asia, see Goswami, Producing 
India 2004 (n. 35), 209–241.
38   Zachariah, Benjamin. Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c. 1930–50 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43.
39   Visvesvaraya’s influential text, Planned Economy for India, argued that planning was a 
means for national discipline and regeneration. See Khilnani, Sunil. The Idea of India 
(London: Penguin Books, 1997).
40   In 1944, eight prominent industrialists published A Plan of Economic Development for 
India. See Kudaisya, Medha. ‘ “The Promise of Partnership”: Indian Business, the State, 
and the Bombay Plan of 1944’. Business History Review 88(1) (2014), 97–131.
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which was set up in 1938, and included industrialists, scientists, politicians, and 
academics.41
This intellectual consensus on the role of the state included an interest in 
extending the state’s control over economic policy and resources, including 
capital, natural resources, and people. The aspiration to exert control over cap-
ital, for instance, could be seen in the tussle over fiscal control during negotia-
tions over a possible federation of British India and the princely states in the 
1930s:42 while British Indian leaders sought extensive powers of taxation for 
the federal centre, the princely states preferred a model whereby they would 
retain those powers, with the centre being limited to raising indirect taxes.43 
Post-independence, the Indian state also sought to exert control over the 
banking system. In 1955, the Imperial Bank of India, the foremost commercial 
bank of colonial India, was nationalised to form the State Bank of India, which 
would ‘constantly align its activities to the needs of a growing economy as en-
visaged in successive five-year plans’.44 Banks of the erstwhile princely states 
were converted to subsidiaries of the State Bank of India,45 thereby extending 
central supervision over capital that had been under the control of the states. 
Even partition refugees were treated as resources who could be ‘utilis[ed] … in 
broader processes of nation building’.46
These aims of centralised planning and control over resources pushed ad-
vocates to argue in favour of the territorialisation of the nation. British India 
had been organised as a geographical space through the colonial technological 
41   Chakrabarty, Bidyut. ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and Planning, 1938–41: India at the Crossroads’. 
Modern Asian Studies 26(2) (1992), 276–281.
42   On the failed proposal to create a federation in 1930s South Asia, see Muldoon, Andrew. 
Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Pillai, 
Sarath. ‘Fragmenting the Nation: Divisible Sovereignty and Travancore’s Quest for Federal 
Independence’. Law and History Review 34(3) (2016), 743–782; Purushotham, Sunil. 
‘Federating the Raj: Hyderabad, Sovereign Kingship, and Partition’. Modern Asian Studies 
54(1) (2020), 157–198.
43   See, for instance, the numerous references to taxation in documents relating to the 
federal negotiations, including Letter from Kailas Narain Haksar to Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
3 March 1934, Sapru Papers, Version II, 2nd series, Reel 8, IOR Neg 5004; Note on a 
Memorandum Describing Federation as Dangerous to the States, 1936, India Office 
Records, Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections, British Library, London, IOR/L/PS/13/613; 
and Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Chamber of Princes, February 1937, 
Federal Papers, vol. II, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
44   Ray, Abhik. The Evolution of the State Bank of India, vol. 4 (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 
20.
45   See Balachandran, Gopalan. The Reserve Bank of India, 1951–1967 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 355–396.
46   Sen, Uditi. Citizen Refugee: Forging the Indian Nation after Partition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 87.
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networks of irrigation canals, roads, and railways,47 and late nineteenth-century 
nationalist discourse built upon this order to envision a territorially bound na-
tional entity of India.48 However, the landscape of colonial South Asia contin-
ued to be riven by legal distinctions among British India, the princely states, 
and the frontier regions,49 which proved to be a boon for Indian capitalists who 
exploited these ambiguities to their advantage. A prime example was the suc-
cess of the Tata Iron and Steel Company in playing authorities in British India 
and the princely states in eastern India off each other to gain access to valu-
able mineral resources at minimal cost.50 Consequently, advocates of planning 
bemoaned ‘the confusion created by the myriads of political units … perhaps 
without any parallel in the world’.51 Since planning was seen as a technocratic 
exercise that was above and beyond the realm of politics,52 the existence of 
entities such as the princely states, which created a space for political and 
legal manoeuvring, was considered to be an obstacle for the achievement of 
economic sovereignty. The ability to compete in an increasingly international 
economic order instead required centralised control, planning, co-ordination, 
and the consolidation of the state’s territories. This unified national space for 
development had to be created and it was done through the articulation of 
a version of sovereignty that privileged exclusive and absolute control over 
defined territory. In the next two sections, I will examine arguments made in 
two international disputes – over the princely state of Hyderabad and over the 
river Indus – in order to trace the repeated assertion of territorial sovereignty 
by Indian officials.
47   Prakash, Gyan. Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 159–170.
48   For a discussion of the creation of an imagined conception of ‘Bharat’ as a spatially bound 
national entity amongst late nineteenth-century upper caste, middle class Hindus, see 
Goswami, Producing India 2004 (n. 35).
49   For discussions of the uneven legal landscape of colonial South Asia, see Benton, Lauren. 
A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 236–260; Ray, Reeju. ‘Interrupted Sovereignties in 
the North East Frontier of British India, 1787–1870’. Modern Asian Studies 53(2) (2019), 
606–632.
50   Raianu, Mircea. ‘ “A Mass of Anomalies”: Land, Law, and Sovereignty in an Indian Company 
Town’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 60(2) (2018), 369–377.
51   Sharma, Tulsi Ram. The Location of Industries in India (Bombay: Hind Kitabs Limited, 
1946), 3–4, quoted in Raianu, ‘A Mass of Anomalies’ 2018 (n. 50), 369.
52   Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments 1993 (n. 35), 200–205.
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4 Hyderabad and India at the United Nations
Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 provided that British suzer-
ainty over the princely states would lapse on the creation of the dominions 
of India and Pakistan.53 The logical implication was that the states would ‘be-
come wholly independent’,54 which led to fears of the ‘Balkanisation’ of the 
subcontinent.55 However, on account of the efforts of Vallabhbhai Patel, the 
minister of states, V.P. Menon, his administrative deputy, and the viceroy, Louis 
Mountbatten, most of the princes signed instruments of accession in favour 
of India.56 In some cases, there was resistance to these claims of consolidated 
territory by the new dominion of India: one of the most contentious acces-
sions was that of Hyderabad, the richest, most populous, and perhaps the most 
distinguished of all the states.
Hyderabad’s ruler, the nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, was considered to 
be a symbol of Muslim kingship although the state had a majority Hindu 
population.57 There were extensive debates over the appropriate path for 
Hyderabad after the partition of British India,58 but ultimately, the nizam 
made a bid for independence, gathering support from across the state’s po-
litical and social spectrum; Muslim subjects, the landed elite, administra-
tive officials, and two large dalit organisations all provided their backing.59 A 
standstill agreement executed in November 1947 between Hyderabad and the 
government of India retained pre-independence arrangements on matters of 
common concern (defence, external affairs, and communications), precluded 
53   United Kingdom, The Indian Independence Act, 1947, Section 7.
54   This expression was used by Stafford Cripps. See Text of Cripps’ press conference, 
16 May 1946, in The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. 7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970–83), 597.
55   This turn of phrase can be found in a letter from Nehru to Mountbatten. See Purushotham, 
‘Federating the Raj’ (n. 42), 193.
56   Copland, The Princes of India 1997 (n. 17), 253–258.
57   On Hyderabad’s position as a symbol of Muslim sovereignty, see Beverley, Eric Lewis. 
Hyderabad, British India and the World: Muslim Networks and Minor Sovereignty, c. 1850–
1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). On the composition of the popula-
tion of the state, it is important to note that although Muslims and Hindus in South Asia 
are culturally and linguistically diverse, the communities were mobilised and construct-
ed as uniform political categories under colonial conditions. See, for instance, Copland, 
Ian. “Communalism’ in Princely India: The Case of Hyderabad, 1930–1940’. Modern Asian 
Studies 22(4) (1988), 783–814; and Pandey, Gyanendra. The Construction of Communalism 
in Colonial North India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
58   For overviews of these debates, see Datla, ‘Sovereignty and the End of Empire’ 2018 
(n. 29), and Purushotham, ‘Federating the Raj’ 2020 (n. 42).
59   Purushotham, Sunil. ‘Internal Violence: The “Police Action” in Hyderabad’. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 57(2) (2015), 435–466, 439.
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India from sending troops to the state, and provided for arbitration in the case 
of disputes.60
Negotiations over the future relationship soon broke down, with each 
side accusing the other of violating the terms of the standstill agreement. 
Hyderabad claimed that India had started an unofficial economic blockade on 
account of which the state had a shortage of essential supplies. Indian officials 
demanded Hyderabad disband the razakars, a volunteer-based paramilitary 
force that it claimed was responsible for attacks on Hindus both in the state 
and across the border in Indian territory; press reports on these alleged atroci-
ties, however, appear to have been greatly exaggerated. Hyderabad representa-
tives made counter-accusations, insisting that militias in camps on the Indian 
side of the border were responsible for violence against state residents.61
After India refused Hyderabad’s request to refer the dispute to arbitration, 
the nizam’s advisors (who included the well-respected British lawyers, Walter 
Monckton and Hersch Lauterpacht) decided to approach the United Nations. 
On 21 August 1948, the nizam sent a telegram to the president of the Security 
Council, requesting that the dispute between Hyderabad and India be brought 
to the attention of the Council as it was ‘likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security’.62 In a more detailed memorandum, 
Hyderabad claimed that India’s actions, which included ‘threatening state-
ments of leading Indian politicians and an assiduously fostered propaganda in 
the press and on the wireless; … encouragement … of border incidents and ac-
tual invasions of Hyderabad territory … and … a ruthless economic blockade’,63 
constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibited the 
use of force or threats of the use of force against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any state.64 On 13 September, before the complaint 
was put on the Security Council’s agenda, Indian troops invaded Hyderabad.65
60   Noorani, Abdul G. The Destruction of Hyderabad (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 173.
61   Descriptions of the situation can be found in Noorani, The Destruction of Hyderabad 2014 
(n. 60), 187–198; and Purushotham, ‘Internal Violence’ 2015 (n. 59), 441–450.
62   Cablegram from the Hyderabad Government to the President of the Security Council, 
21 August 1948, S/986, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87633 (last accessed on 
25 September 2020).
63   The Complaint of Hyderabad against the Dominion of India under Article 35(2) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 11, File 48, Walter Monckton Papers (Balliol College Archives, 
Oxford).
64   The Complaint of Hyderabad (n. 63), 11–16.
65   Quite duplicitously, official Indian histories have always referred to the invasion as a ‘po-
lice action’ rather than an invasion. See, for instance, the official ministry of defence pub-
lication, Prasad, Sri N. Operation Polo: The Police Action against Hyderabad, 1948 (Delhi: 
Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1972).
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The Security Council started discussion of the Hyderabad issue on 
16 September. Moin Nawaz Jung, Hyderabad’s representative, accused India 
of committing ‘an act of aggression by invading the independent State of 
Hyderabad’66 in order ‘to coerce the Government of Hyderabad to renounce 
the independence of its country and make it, politically and internationally, 
part of India’.67 In response, Ramaswami Mudaliar, who was representing 
India, simply stated that in India’s view, ‘Hyderabad is not competent to bring 
any question before the Security Council; that it is not a State; that it is not 
independent’.68 After Mudaliar sought time to publish documents supporting 
his argument, the matter was adjourned till 20 September.69
On 17 September, the nizam announced a ceasefire with his troops surren-
dering to the Indian army,70 and on 22 September, he stated that the delegation 
had ceased to have any authority to represent the state of Hyderabad before 
the United Nations.71 Hyderabad’s representatives were never heard on the 
matter again, but on 6 October, Pakistan requested permission to participate in 
the discussion,72 which was granted on 15 December.73
The matter was finally discussed at a Security Council session in May 1949, 
with India being represented by B.N. Rau and Pakistan by Mohammed Zafrullah 
Khan. Rau maintained that Hyderabad had ‘never been a State in the 
66   United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd year, 357th Meeting, S/PV.357, 
16 September 1948, 12, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87943 (last accessed on 
25 September 2020).
67   Ibid., 15.
68   Ibid., 18–19.
69   Ibid., 21–22.
70   This is unsurprising as Hyderabad’s forces proved no match for the Indian army. By all 
accounts, Indian troops either engaged in or, at the very least, permitted atrocities to be 
carried out against the local Muslim population during and after the invasion. The extent 
of violence remains unclear, with estimates of the number of Muslims who died ranging 
from 50,000 to 200,000. In addition, there were also allegations of Hindu mobs engaging 
in the widespread looting of Muslim households and businesses, the abduction and rape 
of Muslim women, and forced conversions. See Noorani, The Destruction of Hyderabad 
2014 (n. 60), 221–246; Purushotham, ‘Internal Violence’ 2015 (n. 59), 450–463.
71   Cablegram from the nizam of Hyderabad to the United Nations, 22 September 1948, S/1011, 
available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87459 (last accessed on 25 September 2020).
72   Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the President of the Security 
Council, 6 October 1948, S/1027, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/88015 (last 
accessed on 25 September 2020).
73   United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd year, 384th Meeting, S/PV.384, 
15 December 1948, 41–42, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87794 (last accessed 
on 25 September 2020).
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international sense’74 and had never been recognised as an independent 
state by any other country in the world. He noted that in July 1947, Hartley 
Shawcross, the British delegate to the United Nations, had stated that the 
United Kingdom did not propose to recognise the princely states as separate 
international entities. Further, from November 1947, there had been a stand-
still agreement under which India had exclusive charge of Hyderabad’s foreign 
affairs.75 In Rau’s words, Hyderabad was ‘in the heart of India’ and so ‘India 
cannot possibly recognize any of these Indian States lying within its borders 
as independent, any more than the United States of America can allow the in-
dependence of its southern states’.76 India, he repeated, ‘cannot possibly agree 
to be dismembered or disintegrated by allowing any of these Indian States to 
claim international statehood’.77 Rather dramatically, he asserted, ‘Hyderabad 
was not a State in the international sense before the Indian Independence Act; 
it is not one now by virtue of the standstill agreement and the arrangements 
that followed it; and it cannot be one at any time in the future if India is to 
live. We cannot defy or ignore geography’.78 Following from this, he argued 
that it was obvious ‘that any dispute with Hyderabad is not an international 
dispute. All matters relating to Hyderabad are now dealt with regularly by 
the Government of India as matters of domestic concern’.79 The matter was 
‘wholly within the domestic jurisdiction of India’ and since it was not of ‘an 
international character’, there was little useful purpose for it to remain before 
the Security Council.80
In response, Zafrullah Khan described India’s military action as ‘entirely un-
justified’, a ‘breach of international peace’, and ‘a continuation of aggression 
which calls for redress’.81 He claimed that although the United Kingdom had 
hoped for the states to accede to either India or Pakistan, those states that 
did not do so, i.e. states like Hyderabad, were free to be independent.82 He 
also refused to countenance the argument that the Hyderabad case was a 
74   United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 4th year, 425th Meeting, S/PV.425, 
19 May 1949, 2, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87231 (last accessed on 25 
September 2020).
75   Ibid., 6.
76   Ibid., 6–7.
77   Ibid., 7.
78   Ibid.
79   Ibid.
80   Ibid. See also Letter from the Representative of India to the President of the Security 
Council, 18 May 1949, S/1324, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/86918 (last ac-
cessed on 25 September 2020).
81   United Nations, S/PV.425 1949 (n. 74), 8–9.
82   Ibid., 9–10.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/05/2021 04:55:13PM
via free access
16 10.1163/15718050-12340169 | Saksena
Journal of the history of International Law  (2020) 1–28
domestic matter since ‘the mere fact that its independence has been destroyed 
does not make the dispute a domestic matter for India’.83 Indian military ac-
tion constituted, in his view, an act of aggression against an independent state 
and therefore, was a breach of international peace.84 He urged the Council 
to take provisional action to stop the persecution of Muslims in Hyderabad,85 
and also called for a plebiscite to determine the future of Hyderabad ‘under the 
guidance, supervision and control of the United Nations’.86 In response to this 
impassioned submission, the president of the Council simply thanked Khan, 
stating that he was ‘sure that the members of the Council will keep this informa-
tion in mind’.87 The matter slowly faded from world memory,88 leaving Indian 
officials free to weld Hyderabad into the Indian union. In November 1949, 
the nizam issued a firman declaring that the Indian constitution would also 
apply to Hyderabad; this was considered equivalent to the signing of an instru-
ment of accession, completing the process of amalgamating Hyderabad into 
Indian territory.89
The Hyderabad dispute has been seen as a key moment for state-making 
in postcolonial South Asia. Scholars like Sunil Purushotham have focused on 
the role played by violence in the process of incorporating Hyderabad into 
Indian territory to argue that such crises were ‘constitutive events through 
which a new state and the regime of sovereignty emerged’.90 Others like Taylor 
Sherman have used the case to trace the multiple and flexible strategies that 
Indian administrators used to manage issues such as relations between Hindus 
and Muslims and the suppression of a communist rebellion.91 In addition to 
the role of violence and administration in the creation of the postcolonial 
Indian state, it is also necessary to focus on the legal idea of territorial sover-
eignty in the shaping of state space. As the arguments made before the Security 
83   Ibid., 14.
84   Ibid., 15.
85   United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 4th year, 426th Meeting, S/PV.426, 
24 May 1949, 28–29, available at: http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/87232 (last accessed on 
25 September 2020).
86   Ibid., 30.
87   Ibid. 31.
88   Noorani, The Destruction of Hyderabad 2014 (n. 60), 247–268; Eagleton, Clyde. ‘The Case 
of Hyderabad Before the Security Council’. American Journal of International Law 44(2) 
(1950), 277–302.
89   Yazdani, Zubaida. ‘The End of an Era’, in Hyderabad: After the Fall, ed. Omar Khalidi 
(Wichita: Hyderabad Historical Society, 1988), 90–94.
90   Purushotham, ‘Internal Violence’ 2015 (n. 59), 435.
91   Sherman, Taylor C. ‘The Integration of the Princely State of Hyderabad and the Making 
of the Postcolonial State in India, 1948–56’. The Indian Economic and Social History Review 
44(4) (2007), 489–516.
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Council demonstrate, Indian officials repeatedly articulated a vision of sover-
eignty that privileged the absolute and exclusive control of defined territory. 
The princely states were seen by many Indian politicians as a ‘fifth column’ 
that impeded planned ‘development’.92 Centralised control over economic 
resources required the consolidation of territory, leaving no space for the ex-
istence of semi-autonomous entities such as Hyderabad within the territory 
claimed by India. As a result, Mudaliar claimed that the invasion of Hyderabad 
by the Indian army was not an invasion but action to preserve ‘law and order’, 
which was within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of India, rather than being a mat-
ter of ‘international concern’. In the aftermath of the chaos and violence of 
partition, and with the vision of centralised economic planning in mind, it was 
the articulation of the legal idea of territorial sovereignty during the course of 
international disputes such as the Hyderabad case that created the notion of a 
uniform state space and formed the basis of the Indian nation-state.
5 India, Pakistan, and the Dispute over the Indus Basin
The decision to partition British India into two dominions was announced on 
3 June 1947. The task of actually dividing the territory was given to a British 
lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, whose award was published on 17 August, two days 
after independence, leading to administrative chaos and spiralling violence.93 
There is, quite rightly, a significant amount of literature on the human cost of 
partition,94 but there has also been a recent focus on the impact of the divi-
sion of infrastructure systems on the new dominions.95 This scholarship brings 
to the fore Radcliffe’s consideration of ‘other factors’ during the boundary 
92   See Prakash, Another Reason 1999 (n. 47), 208.
93   Khan, Yasmin. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, new ed. 2017 [2007]), 1–3.
94   See, for instance, Butalia, Urvashi. The other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of 
India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali. The 
Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Khan, The Great Partition 2017 (n. 93).
95   See, for instance, Chester, Lucy. Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary 
Commission and the Partition of Punjab (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 
73–105; Haines, Daniel. ‘Disputed Rivers: Sovereignty, Territory and State-Making in South 
Asia, 1948–1951’. Geopolitics 19(3) (2014), 632–655; Haines, Daniel. Rivers Divided: Indus 
Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); 
Amrith, Sunil. Unruly Waters: How Mountain Rivers and Monsoons Have Shaped South 
Asia’s History (London: Allen Lane, 2018), 182–188. These accounts add to the early ex-
amination of the impact of partition on the canals of Punjab in Michel, Aloys Arthur. The 
Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
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drawing process. One of these factors was infrastructure, particularly canals, 
headworks, roads, railways, and ports.96 In particular, Radcliffe ‘was deeply 
impressed  … by the great importance of not allowing the physical division 
of territory to sterilize the working of the interrelated irrigation systems’.97 
This understanding of the criticality of infrastructure proved to be prescient 
when a crisis erupted over the rivers of the Indus basin. The British had en-
gaged in an extensive project of constructing canals in the region,98 but these 
were awkwardly divided when the border was drawn, with India being allot-
ted the Ferozepur headworks that served canals leading into West Punjab in 
Pakistan.99 So partition left India, as the upstream state, with greater potential 
to control the flow of water in the Indus basin.
On 18 December 1947, engineers in the now-divided provinces of East and 
West Punjab signed a standstill agreement that provided, among other things, 
for the maintenance of the pre-partition allocation of water in the Indus basin 
irrigation system; the initial terminal date for the agreement was 31 March 1948. 
On 1  April, East Punjab engineers alleged that their counterparts in West 
Punjab had failed to renew the standstill agreement and proceeded to shut off 
water supplies from the Ferozepur headworks to the canal systems that sup-
plied water to West Pakistan. Consequently, millions of farmers found them-
selves without water supplies at the start of the sowing season and Lahore, one 
of Pakistan’s largest cities, was deprived of its main water source.100
Following furious negotiations, on 4 May 1948, India and Pakistan signed an 
inter-dominion agreement to restore the flow of water after Pakistan agreed 
to pay annual seigniorage charges.101 In 1951, Pakistan repudiated the agree-
ment, but the two states agreed to use the good offices of the World Bank to 
discuss the dispute and negotiate a settlement.102 The Indus Waters Treaty was 
finally signed in 1960 and effectively partitioned the Indus river system: the 
eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas) were awarded to India and the western 
rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were awarded to Pakistan. The treaty also 
96   Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia 2009 (n. 95), 80–82.
97   Personal Communication from Cyril Radcliffe to Aloys Arthur Michel, 28 March 1965, as 
quoted in Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 164, fn. 47.
98   For a description of the stages of the canal building process, see Michel, The Indus Rivers 
1967 (n. 95), 58–98.
99   Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 7.
100   Baxter, Richard R. ‘The Indus Basin’, in The Law of International Drainage Basins, eds. 
Albert H. Garretson, Robert D. Hayton and Cecil J. Olmstead (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana 
Publications, 1967), 443–485, 449–451; Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 195–197; 
Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 42.
101   Baxter, ‘The Indus Basin’ 1967 (n. 100), 452; Haines, ‘Disputed Rivers’ 2014 (n. 95), 640; 
Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 43.
102   Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 225.
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provided for an information-sharing mechanism and set up a two-member 
Permanent Indus Commission to oversee implementation and matters of 
treaty interpretation. If the Commission is unable to resolve the question, the 
issue is referred to a ‘neutral expert’ or ultimately to a seven-member court 
of arbitration.103
Although the treaty mechanisms reinforce the idea that the conflict was a 
technical dispute over water resources, Daniel Haines compellingly argues that 
it was shaped by political discourses and power relations. He contends that 
the crux of the matter, as in the case of other transboundary river disputes, 
related to sovereignty, and the often-complicated relationship between water, 
territory, and the state.104 Pakistan based its claim to the waters of the Indus 
and its tributaries on the ‘historical usage’ approach, claiming ‘it had the right 
to continue its historical uses of canal water that flowed through India on the 
way to Pakistan’.105 India, on the other hand, insisted that it had acquired the 
riparian rights of British India as a successor state and owed no responsibilities 
to Pakistan, which did not exist prior to 1947.106 More significantly, Indian of-
ficials continually asserted that ‘everything on Indian soil was Indian’, a claim 
of some significance since the canal headworks were in Ferozepur in India, 
putting Indian irrigation engineers in control of the flow of water.107 The ac-
tion of shutting off water supplies to canals in Pakistan asserted India’s claim 
‘to all the water in all the rivers that flowed through her territory’, in line with 
Nehru’s sentiment that ‘what India did with India’s rivers was India’s affair’.108 
Engineers in East Punjab also produced a report dismissing Pakistan’s claim 
based on historical usage, arguing that the ability to invoke such rights depend-
ed on the two entities being part of the same ‘Sovereign Entity’.109 This was 
based on an 1895 argument made by the then attorney-general of the United 
States, Judson Harmon; he had claimed that allowing a different nation-state 
to claim historical use rights would be ‘inconsistent’ with the sovereignty of the 
upstream state. The Harmon doctrine, however, was repudiated by the United 
States shortly thereafter and few international law scholars have recognised its 
103   For discussions of details of the treaty and its working, see Baxter, ‘The Indus Basin’ 
1967 (n. 100), 467–476; Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 256–257; and Sattar, Erum, 
Jason Robison and Daniel McCool. ‘Evolution of Water Institutions in the Indus Basin: 
Reflections from the Law of the Colorado River’. University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform 51(4) (2018), 715–775, 734–739.
104   Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 6–12.
105   Haines, ‘Disputed Rivers’ 2014 (n. 95), 641. For a detailed discussion of Pakistan’s argu-
ments in the Indus dispute, see Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 49–58.
106   Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 200.
107   Haines, ‘Disputed Rivers’ 2014 (n. 95), 641; and Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 44.
108   Michel, The Indus Rivers 1967 (n. 95), 197.
109   Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 46.
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validity.110 Despite some initial misgivings about East Punjab’s reliance on the 
Harmon doctrine and the actions of the engineers more generally, Nehru’s gov-
ernment soon took up this argument, claiming that prevailing international 
law was unsuitable for application in the case of two countries that had ‘come 
into existence from the partition of a previously existing national unit’.111
The controversy over the Indus basin was unsurprising since control over 
water was seen as essential for agrarian growth and industrial progress. Several 
scholars have highlighted the significance of large hydroelectric projects for de-
velopmentalist imagination and state-building in 1950s India.112 Daniel Haines, 
in particular, focuses on the Indus dispute to assert that control over water was 
critical for the legitimacy of the independent Indian state.113 Since sovereignty 
‘is not a given’, but something to be acquired through the enactment of state 
authority over territory,114 he argues that the dispute was significant for the 
creation of a distinctively ‘national space’ for the purposes of economic devel-
opment in India. Key to fashioning this ‘unified internal space of India’ were 
activities such as the levy of seigniorage charges against Pakistan, which was a 
mechanism to distinguish ‘Indian’ from ‘foreign’ territory.115 For Haines, India’s 
territorial relationship with water was a legacy of the British colonial state’s 
spatialisation of power through technology such as railways, canals, and tele-
graph systems. As a result, India linked control over water with control over 
territory, with consequences for the relationship among water, territory, and 
state space.116
In addition to considering the territorialisation of India through colonial 
technology, it is also necessary to examine the legal conception of unified terri-
tory to understand the critical role played by the Indus dispute in postcolonial 
state-making. Much like in the case of Hyderabad, Indian officials adopted a 
territorial version of sovereignty in the Indus dispute. The extension of control 
over resources such as water was done through the articulation of a vision of 
absolute control over defined territory. Law, particularly the specific legal vision 
of territorial sovereignty, was critical for creating and moulding the ‘national 
110   Haines, ‘Disputed Rivers’ 2014 (n. 95), 641; Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 46. For 
further discussion of the Harmon doctrine, see Lipper, Jerome. ‘Equitable Utilization’, 
in Garretson/Hayton/Olmstead, The Law of International Drainage Basins 1967 (n. 100), 
20–23; and McCaffrey, Stephen. ‘The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, 
Not Praised’. Natural Resources Journal 36(3) (1996), 549–590.
111   Amrith, Unruly Waters 2018 (n. 95), 185–186.
112   Khilnani, The Idea of India 1997 (n. 39), 61; Prakash, Another Reason 1999 (n. 47), 234–235; 
and Amrith, Unruly Waters 2018 (n. 95), 186.
113   Haines, Rivers Divided 2017 (n. 95), 36–40.
114   Ibid., 11–12.
115   Ibid., 44–45.
116   Ibid., 2, 36–37.
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space’ of India at a time when the shape of the nation was uncertain. Instead of 
treating territorial sovereignty as an ideology that gave ‘more’ attention to the 
importance of sovereignty in international relations,117 we should recognise 
it as a specific and distinct version of sovereignty that was pervasive in elite 
thinking and conceptions of a new India in the post-partition period. Flipping 
around the idea that sovereignty was ‘the object of the water dispute’,118 the 
Indus case instead provides a lens to understand how sovereignty became the 
means for the construction of a defined national space in which authority 
could be exercised and the principal language in which international disputes 
were debated and resolved. The articulation of absolute and exclusive territo-
rial sovereignty allowed Indian officials to claim control over water and other 
resources considered to be essential for economic planning and development. 
As these disputes demonstrate, the legitimation of the state as a vector for the 
economic development of a defined territory came through law.
6 Consequences and Conclusions
The emergence of the territorially sovereign nation-state as the established 
form of political and economic organisation in the world was mediated by a 
variety of historical, social, and cultural factors. Ideas of economic develop-
ment were particularly influential since a defining trait of anti-colonial na-
tionalism was the promise of post-independence progress, which, for many 
Indian elites, demanded economic planning and a centralised state. Effective 
planning, however, also required consolidated territory, which the landscape 
of South Asia, with its maze of legally differentiated territories, did not readily 
offer. This integrated state space, i.e. the Indian nation-state, as other scholars 
have argued, did not simply appear fully formed in the aftermath of decoloni-
sation and partition; it had to be created. In this article, I have traced the role 
played by legal ideas  – i.e. a specific version of sovereignty that focused on 
the exclusive control over territory – in the construction of the spatial unity 
forming the nation-state of India. By defining sovereignty as territorial and ex-
clusive in disputes over Hyderabad and the Indus basin, Indian politicians and 
bureaucrats fashioned a distinctively ‘national’ economic and political space 
within which the state would exercise control over all persons and resources.119
117   Ibid., 35.
118   Ibid., 49.
119   These assertions of absolute territorial control were considered to be part of the process 
of nation-state creation, even if they conflicted with or were undermined by the ‘lived re-
alities’ of inhabitants. See Leake, Elisabeth and Daniel Haines. ‘Lines of (In)Convenience: 
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Given global intellectual currents, the postcolonial pursuit of economic 
development within a coherently defined national space was, perhaps, to be 
expected. The process of territorialising the nation, however, was often violent 
(as seen in the Hyderabad case), and also had other long-lasting consequences, 
particularly for the nature of citizenship. As the idea of consolidated national 
territory became increasingly important, the difference between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ India became increasingly sharp, with borders becoming ever more 
significant in defining the nation. Initially, India’s constitution drafters pro-
posed jus soli as the basis of citizenship, considering the grant of citizenship 
based on birth within Indian territory to be ‘enlightened’ and ‘modern’ as op-
posed to jus sanguinis, which was seen as ‘racial’ citizenship.120 Despite the 
promise of equality in this conception of citizenship, specific groups within 
the borders of the new state were quickly defined as ‘minority’ communities 
that were different from the national majority and were increasingly cast as 
‘aliens’ and ‘outsiders’, even if they had resided in India for considerable peri-
ods of time.121 The idea of linking citizenship with territory was also brought 
under pressure by the enormous influx of refugees after partition, most of 
whom had no links with the territory of what became India. So in addition to 
jus soli citizenship, the constitution also provided for citizenship to persons 
who had migrated to India from what had become the state of Pakistan.122
Despite making these changes to citizenship laws to accommodate refugees, 
India did not go on adopt the principle of jus sanguinis; territory persisted in 
playing a significant role in the definition of citizenship. Most notable was the 
decision by independent India’s constitution drafters to not bestow citizenship 
to persons of South Asian descent who resided in other countries. A specific 
consequence of this choice was the abandonment of the large diaspora, which 
Indian nationalists had been particular in courting during the struggle against 
Sovereignty and Border-Making in Postcolonial South Asia, 1947–1965’. Journal of Asian 
Studies 76(4) (2017), 963–985, 965.
120   Jayal, Niraja Gopal. ‘Citizenship’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, eds. 
Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 163–179, 166.
121   Abraham, How India Became Territorial 2014 (n. 20), 69; Jayal, Niraja Gopal. Citizenship 
and Its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 53–56.
122   Although the constitution was welcoming of Muslim refugees on paper, in reality, the 
claims of returning Muslims was intensely contested. As a result, Niraja Jayal argues, there 
were elements of jus sanguinis in official bureaucratic decisions from the very beginning, 
with more explicit changes in the law coming later on; the tension between these two 
ideas of citizenship, therefore, was present from the founding of the republic. See Jayal, 
Citizenship and Its Discontents 2013 (n. 121), 51–81.
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colonialism.123 The strong transnational element of the independence move-
ment, which had included participation from overseas Indians, was soon over-
shadowed by the concerns of territorial nationalism.124 As a result of this focus 
on the territorial nation-state model, citizenship (although strongly inflecting 
by notions of religion and class) and its attendant rights were soon restricted to 
those who resided within new India’s territorial borders. This decision has had 
lasting consequences on questions such as the claims of immigrants on state 
resources (for instance, welfare or access to justice) and the ramifications of 
statelessness.125 The definition of citizenship has only become more contested 
in recent years as seen in the massive popular protests over India’s recently-
enacted Citizenship Amendment Act that provides a path to citizenship for 
certain non-Muslim refugees from neighbouring countries.
With the universalisation of the nation-state model in the middle of the 
twentieth century, there were similar consequences of the crystallisation of 
borders and the emphasis on territory across the world.126 By exploring the 
assertion of territorial sovereignty by Indian elites in post-independence inter-
national disputes, we can see the key creative role played by law and legal ideas 
in the spatialisation of the nation, i.e. in the construction of the territorially 
sovereign Indian nation-state in the aftermath of decolonisation.
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